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Abstract  
Much of what we know about the alignment of voters with parties comes from 
mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from aggregate electoral 
data. Using individual elector level panel data from 19th-century United Kingdom 
poll books, we reassess the development of a party-centred electorate. We show 
that (i) the electorate was party-centred by the time of the extension of the franchise 
in 1867; (ii) a decline in candidate-centred voting is largely attributable to changes 
in the behaviour of the working class; and (iii) the enfranchised working class 
aligned with the Liberal left. This early alignment of the working class with the 
left cannot entirely be explained by a decrease in vote buying. The evidence 
suggests instead that the alignment was based on the programmatic appeal of the 
Liberals. We argue that these facts can plausibly explain the subsequent 
development of the party system. 
Key words: Candidate-vs-party-oriented voting, party development, partisan 
alignment 
JEL classes: C23, D72, N33 
 
 
1 Introduction
A central element in the political development of a country is the connection between
voters and those who represent them. This connection can take different forms: it may
exist due to patronage, vote buying, or coercion; be based on the personal characteristics
or beliefs of the candidate; or arise due to an affiliation between voters and particular
parties. An important distinction is that between candidate-centred systems and party-
oriented ones. In the latter, voters are loyal to their preferred party and cast their votes
without regard to the personal characteristics, beliefs, or favours offered by candidates.
These patterns of development vary across countries and over time. In the United
States parties that emerged as loose coalitions or caucuses of legislators (Aldrich 1995),
developed into the well-oiled machines of the early nineteenth century that delivered
patronage. As these weakened in the latter part of the century, due in part to civil service
reform as well as the introduction of primary elections, a candidate centred system
emerged (Folke, Hirano, and Snyder 2011). Duverger (1959, p. 28) noted a different
pattern of party development in European parliamentary democracies where “first there
is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees,
and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements.”
According to Duverger the key factors that lead to the emergence of such party-oriented
systems were the extension of popular suffrage, the role of parliamentary prerogatives,
and (later, and in some countries) the emergence of organized mass parties on the left
who connected with working class voters on the basis of ideology. Indeed, recent work
by Hidalgo (2012) shows that extension of the franchise in Brazil is causally related to
the votes shares of parties with clear ideological profiles. Moreover, Fujiwara and
Wantchekon (2013) show that party-oriented systems, based on parties with clear
ideological programmes, can have positive welfare effects.
It is important then to understand when and why such parties emerge and what are
the institutional (and other) determinants. Much of what we know about the alignment
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of voters with parties in the developed world comes from mass surveys of the electorate,
developed and implemented in the postwar period, or from aggregate electoral data. The
problemwith the former, is that it limits our understanding to changes in party alignment
that occurred after the development of techniques designed to measure such change. The
problem with the latter, is the commonly understood problem of ecological inference: we
can not be sure how aggregate patterns observed in the data relate to individual-level
behaviour.
In this paper we provide a resolution to this problem by analysing historical
individual-level data on actual voting behaviour. Before the establishment of the Ballot
Act in 1872, voting in Parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom was public. Often
the name of each voter and how they voted was recorded in poll books. In addition,
these poll books sometimes provided information, such as electors’ addresses and
occupations. Due to recent work by historians, some poll books have become available
electronically. Here we construct voter level panel data from a sample of 19th century
borough constituencies. Analysing these remarkable data, using appropriate estimation
techniques, provides a unique micro view of the emerging relationship between voters
and political parties in Victorian England.
Our analysis of these data enhances the understanding of party development in
several ways. First, we provide new evidence on the timing of emergence of a
party-oriented electorate in the United Kingdom. Our results corroborate those in the
seminal work by Cox (1984, 1986, 1987) that are based on aggregate data from UK
elections and show that cohesive parties with close links to the electorate preceded the
major (late) Victorian franchise reforms and coincided with a period during which the
executive took control of prerogative. Second, our main and novel contribution uses
voter-level data to understand the driving forces behind partisan alignment. The
analysis of our data reveals that partisan alignment was largely due to the behaviour of
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the skilled working classes, who had been enfranchised in 1832. Third, we show that this
group aligned with the then left Liberal Party.
We also shed light on mechanisms that might explain these patterns in our data,
showing that the increased partisan attachment amongst the electorate can largely be
attributed to a decrease in vote buying or clientelism. We find, however, that working
class voters aligned with the Liberal Party for reasons other than patronage which, as
shown by Stokes et al. (2013) and Camp, Dixit, and Stokes (2014), was in decline during
this period. In fact, our data is consistent with claims made by Stokes and coauthors and
by Cox that the alignment of the working class had more to do with the programmatic
appeal of the Liberal Party.
These results and what they tell us about party alignment in Victorian England have
broad relevance. To our knowledge ours is the first analysis of individual-level data
which confirms that class alignment occurred prior to the enfranchisement of the
(unskilled) working classes and several decades before the development of mass parties
that organised sections of the electorate. In fact the pre-1867 Liberal Party under
Palmerston was a quintessential “cadre party” as defined by Duverger. It was a loose
amalgamation of different parliamentary factions who voted together in parliament and
stood on a common legislative programme, albeit a sparse one. Critically it had no
organisational basis within the electorate. The central lesson then is that class alignment
occurred prior to the development of organised mass parties.
A further lesson involves the dynamic relationship between party support and
programmatic development. That working class voters should align with the left party
at such an early point in Britain’s political development might seem surprising.
Palmerston’s Liberal Party preceded the period of Progressive Liberalism and can not be
compared to Gladstone’s Liberal Party in terms of its programme or legislative
achievements. Nor, of course, was it a party of the workers in the sense that the Labour
Party of the interwar years was to become. And yet is seems plausible that the alignment
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of the skilled working class with the Liberal Party set the stage for subsequent
developments. More generally, our data analysis suggests a simultaneous relationship
between a party’s support base and its programmatic appeal. Working class alignment
with the Liberal Party that existed already in the Mid-Victorian era laid the basis for the
subsequent progressive platforms of the Liberal Party that, in turn, cemented its support
amongst working class voters.1
There are several reasons to believe that our insights hold more generally. Extending
our analysis to aggregate data from a large sample of constituencies we find that voter
eligibility is negatively correlated with proxies for the share of unskilled working classes
in the population, whose voting patterns in the aggregate data closely resemble our
findings in the restricted sample. The aggregate data thus suggests that our findings
might generalise to these segments of the Victorian voting population and so provide an
accurate picture of partisan alignment in Britain at that time.
Moreover, it seems likely that our insights travel beyond 19th century Britain to a
broader set of parliamentary democracies. Institutional features such as the
centralisation of agenda-setting power within the executive gave shape to British
parliamentary democracy. They stimulated the development of parties standing on
coherent programmes outlining their plans for government and were mimicked
elsewhere. That these features are correlated with partisan and class alignment in the
United Kingdom suggests that similar historical patterns exist elsewhere. As described
by Strøm (2000), the conceptual essence of Parliamentary government is a “historical
evolution” – an accident of 19th century Britain that spread to other parts of the world.”
Finally, it is worth remembering that 19th century Britain was a developing country
and so our insights might extend over time to those countries that are developing today.
Indeed our finding that a relationship between parties and voters coincided with the
1For microfounded models of the the relationship between policies and support bases
see Krasa (2018) and Howell, Krasa, and Polborn (2017).
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development of programmatic parties without national bases of organisation chimes
with recent work in political development mentioned earlier. These lessons may be
informative in understanding how developing countries today could move from a
clientelistic system to one with programmatic parties (Hicken 2011; Stokes 2005;
Wantchekon 2003).
2 Institutional Setting and Data
2.1 Victorian Era British Political Landscape
Elections in Britain in the Victorian period under investigation took place under the
first-past-the-post voting system that is still in place. Whilst some constituencies were
single-member constituencies, most constituencies elected two candidates and a few
elected three and four. From around 1850 constituency elections were contested by
candidates who aligned with one of two major parties, the Conservatives and the
Liberals. The Liberals brought together a loose coalition of (mainly) Whigs, Radicals,
and Peelites (a faction that had broken from the Conservatives) and by 1860 formed a
cohesive parliamentary block. For convenience, for our analysis of the years prior to the
formation of a cohesive Liberal Party identity we refer to candidates who are either
Whig or Radical as Liberal.
In the period of analysis, the key institutional reforms were the Great Reform Acts.
The first of these, introduced in 1832, introduced several measures that mitigated
malapportionment: increasing representation in the industrialized cities, and taking
away seats from the so-called rotten boroughs with small voting populations. The act
also increased the male franchise to around 650,000. The Representation of the Peoples
Act, otherwise known as the Second Reform Act, was passed by Parliament on August
15th, 1867. The Second Reform Act, that became law in England and Wales in 1867,
extended the franchise in the boroughs to all males over the age of 21 who were
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inhabitant occupiers, whether house-owners or tenants, and to male lodgers whose rent
was at least 10 pounds per year. A residence of at least one year in the borough was
required. In counties, the franchise was extended to holders of life interests, copyholds
and leases of sixty years and more worth 5 pounds per annum (from a previous
threshold of 10) and to tenants occupying land worth 12 pounds (from a previous
threshold of 50 pounds per annum).
2.2 Poll Book Data
Prior to the next major reform, the Ballot Act of 1872, individual voting records of
registered voters were public and recorded in so called poll books. This historical fact
provides a novel and reliable window into actual individual political behaviour. Using
these data, we can answer questions previously addressed using less detailed aggregate
or less reliable survey data. While Andrews (1998) shows that poll book data may
contain some errors, they are so rare that they will be insignificant to any empirical
analysis. The main limitations are, in fact, that the information content of the poll books
are somewhat limited. We have obtained poll books with the occupations and
information before and after 1865 for three constituencies. Our analysis of these
micro-data confirms the general findings of Cox (1984, 1986, 1987) based on aggregate
data while yielding new insights into the mechanism explaining the emergence of a
party-oriented electorate.
Previously, poll book data have been used mainly in historical research (Drake 1971;
Speck and Gray 1970; Mitchell and Cornford 1977; Phillips 1992; Phillips and Wetherell
1995), where the empirical analysis has been very elementary in nature. Accordingly, in
a more recent work Andrews (1998) states that “some work has been done on poll books
but in general this has been confined to an overview of poll books, or as illustration of
a point in another argument”. Indeed, Andrews’ own descriptive work is rare in that it
utilizes the data in detail and shows that voters in Sandwich change the party they vote
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quite often over time. He supplements this with evidence from other historical records
such as candidates’ accounts to conclude that extensive vote buying took place.
Our focus is on the period after the First Reform Act of 1832 and before The Ballot
Act of 1872. We use only poll books that contain information on occupation and cover
the transition period from candidate to party-oriented system, that is, 1857-1868 as
discussed by Cox (1986). Given these restrictions, we make use of poll books for a
varying number of general elections held in three boroughs in South-Eastern England:
Ashford (four elections in 1852-1868; Drake and Pearce 1992), Sandwich (eight elections
in 1832-1868; Andrews 2001) and Guildford (eight elections in 1832-1865; Sykes 1977).2
We show the location of these constituencies in Appendix S1 (p. 4).3 Digitized versions
of the poll book content are provided by the UK Data Archive (Ashford, UK Data
Archive Study Number 2948; Sandwich, 4170; Guildford, 977). All poll books record
voters’ names and votes. Moreover, Sandwich and Guildford poll books include also
occupations of the voters. For Ashford, we obtain the occupation information for a
fraction of the voters by linking the data with censuses conducted around the period,
directories that also contain occupational information for some of the voters and lists of
landowners. We use a fuzzy merging algorithm, allowing minor differences in spelling
of the first and last names, to link three censuses (1841, 1851 and 1861), directories from
2Ashford was not an independent constituency but part of the constituency of Kent
Eastern.
3Furthermore, the map shows the location of other constituencies for which we have
obtained similar poll books, but which do not include elections from the our period
of interest. While we do not use them in this study, the map shows that occupation
information was collected more widely. There are also more poll books available
electronically that do not contain any occupation information.
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1851, 1855, 1867 and 1874 and lists of land owners to the poll book data. After this, we
assign each voter occupational and class information from the closest available source.
An example of the typical content included in our poll books is illustrated below in
Figure 1 which shows two pages from Sandwich poll book for parliamentary elections
held in 1857. The information contained in these pages tells us for instance that Luke
Jarvis, a publican from Deal, split his vote between two Liberal candidates: E. H. K.
Hugessen, and Lord Clarence Paget.
We have further classified the occupations in working and middle classes in order to
evaluate class differences in voting behaviour. Our classification follows Best (1972) and
Clapham (2009), where the main classification criteria is a typical income of each
occupation. Appendix S1 presents additional details on the data. First, we describe the
occupational composition of different classes (p. 5). Second, we report descriptive
statistics on voting behaviour by class and constituency (p. 6).4 Finally, we report
election results for the elections covered in our data in Appendix S1 (p. 7). For Ashford
we report the election results from the entire constituency of Kent Eastern. There are
typically three or four candidates competing for two seats which means that the
composition of the candidate pool remains relatively stable throughout the time period
we study. Thus, it is not likely that our findings would be driven by changes in the
available electoral candidates.
[Figure 1 about here.]
4In Sandwich and Guildford working class tends to give more split votes but party
preferences are similar across classes. In Ashford, the working class gives less split votes
and votes more for the Liberals than the middle class. However, this difference between
constituencies will turn out to be mainly a result of different election years rather than
within election year geographic differences.
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3 Regression Analysis
3.1 Partisan Alignment
Political parties with close ties to the electorate are a key feature in the historical
development of parliamentary democracies. When and why did such connections arise?
The question is difficult to address since, as noted by Duverger, and as noted earlier,
there are a myriad of factors that can plausibly explain the emergence of a partisan
electorate. One approach, that we follow and extend here was pioneered by Cox in a
sequence of papers and a monograph (1984, 1986, 1987), who looked at within country
variation in split voting over time to understand the timing of key changes.
During the 19th century, most English constituencies elected two MPs under
plurality rule. Cox’s intuitive argument was that party-oriented voters would not split
their votes between the Liberals and Conservatives. Split votes do not affect the seat
allocation between the parties. They do, however, affect which candidates are elected
within a party. Cox showed that split voting (his key indicator of a candidate-centred
electorate) declined dramatically during 1857–1868, and so before the first election under
the new extended franchise in 1868.
Since Cox’s studies it has been understood that cohesive parties with close links to
the electorate preceded the major reforms to the franchise in the late Victorian period,
namely the Second Reform Act of 1867 that enfranchised the unskilled working classes,
the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 that made it harder for candidates to bribe voters, and
the 1884 Reform Act that extended suffrage in the rural counties. Cox (1984, 1986, 1987)
used descriptive analysis of a long and wide panel of aggregate, constituency-level data
to show that the party orientation of Victorian voters occurred, i.e. the share of split
votes declined, a decade or so before these defining institutional changes, thus
challenging the conventional wisdom (see for example Nossiter 1975) that Victorian
voters aligned with political parties because of those reforms. He highlighted instead the
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decline in parliamentary prerogative in the Mid-Victorian period that, when combined
with the centralisation of decision-making authority within a cabinet and the Prime
Minister’s power of dissolution and use of the confidence vote, weakened the role of the
individual MP. A party-oriented electorate developed as voters used their votes to
control the executive and choose between rival teams: an incumbent government and
(Her Majesty’s Loyal) opposition.5
Cox’s analysis of Victorian England remains a seminal study for understanding the
role of parties in parliamentary systems more generally. The institutional developments
that Cox describes as bolstering the development of cohesive parties with close links to
the electorate are, of course, found in other parliamentary democracies and so have been
the subject of a large body of theoretical and empirical research (Huber 1996; Diermeier
and Feddersen 1998).
Despite the seminal nature of Cox’s claims, they rest on the use of aggregate data
from constituency elections in nineteenth century Britain. These constituencies differ in
many unobserved ways, making it hard to support any causal claim regarding what
kind of voters or constituencies in particular changed their voting behaviour. The use of
aggregate historical data to draw inferences about party alignment within the electorate
is problematic as inferences from aggregate data are subject to the well understood
ecological fallacy. Moreover, very different behavioural patterns could be associated
with the same vote share, making any inference difficult to sustain. For example, a party
might obtain 50% of the vote share when half of all voters cast both votes for that party
5Recent work by Eggers and Spirling (2016a) using micro-level data on parliamentary
votes confirm that parties became cohesive in this period and that this is due to changes
in individual behaviour. Eggers and Spirling (2016b) study speech patterns in parliament
to show the centralisation of agenda-setting power by the executive and the emergence
of a shadow cabinet.
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or when each elector casts a split vote. A more specific problem – that we discuss in
Section 4.3 and our supplementary materials – arises due to the fact that, when franchise
restrictions are in place, we cannot accurately infer the population of eligible voters. One
of our contributions is in being able, for the first time, to use individual-level voting
data, recording actual individual-level voting returns, in order to address these issues.
Revisiting Cox’s question on the timing of key changes in the English electorate, we
can check whether regression analysis of our individual-level data corroborates those
earlier findings. Our micro-level analysis allows us to go much further, however, in
exploring which behavioural voting patterns underpin the decline in split level voting
and the apparent emergence of a partisan electorate.
Cox’s main finding was that split level voting had declined by 1865 and almost to
the level that persisted from 1868 onwards, thus prior to the major institutional change
in 1867. However, during the election year 1857 split voting was as common as in the
previous era. In 1859 split voting was lower than in 1857, but still within the variation
of the previous era. We use these findings to split our sample into two periods: the
first contains elections before 1865; the second, those during and after 1865. We use this
classification to conduct difference-in-difference estimation (DID) that allows us to assess
whether in the critical periods the response of the working class was different to that
of the middle class.6 From this perspective, working class can be seen as the treatment
group, and middle class as the control group in the DID.
While our concern is to provide descriptive results on the timing of changes in political
behaviour for different classes, one could give a causal interpretation to these results if
standard DID assumptions are met. The common trend assumption means that absent a
general shift from candidate-oriented to a party-oriented system, the outcome of interest
for the working class and middle class would have evolved with the same trends. We
6Our results do not rely on this particular before-after classification as we show in the
robustness analysis section by reporting a separate estimate for each year.
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provide the standard indirect test of this by testing for the common pre-treatment trends.
Moreover, a causal interpretation would require that any change in the behaviour of the
working class in the post-treatment period did not cause a response in the behaviour of
the middle class, i.e. there should be no spill-overs caused by the effect of interest. If
both of these assumptions hold, a causal claim could be made. However, if not, then DID
regressions and graphical illustrations typical to the DID still provide a useful way of
describing the phenomenon of interest. Our benchmark specification is as follows:
yit =a+ b11[Working class]it + b21[Year   1865]t
+ b31[Working class]it ⇥ 1[Year   1865]t + #it, (1)
where yit is the vote choice of voter i in election t (dummy for casting a split vote in
Table 1, and dummy for Liberal vote in 2). 1[Working class]it indicates whether the voter
belonged to the working classes, and 1[Year   1865]t is an indicator for the election
happening in or after the year 1865. We estimate (1) either separately for each
constituency or using a pooled data from all of them, restricting the sample to those
voters who turn out to vote. We use either no controls or election year fixed effects. Note
that when we include the election year fixed effects, we omit 1[Year   1865]t as this is
already captured by the year dummies for 1865 and 1868. For Guildford, we also
observe more detailed location (parish) information within the constituency and
therefore include that locality fixed effect. With the pooled data, we control for the
election-constituency fixed effects.
The regression results for split voting are presented in Table 1. From the separate
regressions we find that working class status is a strong and robust predictor of split
voting prior to the 1865 elections (the coefficient related to the variable 1[Working class]).
In Guildford and Sandwich this result is significant, but it is imprecise in Ashford.
However, in elections during and subsequent to 1865 we observe that split voting goes
14
down for all voters (the coefficient related to the variable 1[Year   1865]). This result is
highly significant in all constituencies and exactly in line with the aggregate level results
of Cox.
Our data allows us to go further in assessing heterogeneous effects. In particular, we
provide new findings on the evolution of class-based voting. We observe that subsequent
to 1865, the split voting goes down even more for the working class than the middle
class (the coefficient related to the 1[Working class]⇥ 1[Year   1865] variable). This main
effect of interest is present and robust within all constituencies, but statistically significant
only for Sandwich. The pooled analysis confirms these findings and all the results are
significant in the pooled analysis.
As to the interpretation of the coefficients, let us look at specification (6) as an
example. In Sandwich and prior to 1865, 10.6% (Constant = 0.106) of the non-working
class voters gave split votes and 14.5% of the working class did so (Constant + 0.041).
After and during 1865, 5.8% of the non-working class voters gave split votes
(Constant   0.048) and 6.1% of the working class did the same (sum of all the reported
coefficients). Therefore, while we observe that split voting decreased across classes the
decrease was relatively large amongst the working class. More specifically, the reduction
in split voting amongst the working class was large enough to bring them to the same
level observed in the middle class.
In order to visualise our data and the estimation exercise, we plot the share of split
votes among the two classes over time (Figure 2). Our discussion of these results is based
on the bottom-right graph that uses the pooled data. However, for completeness, we also
report separately the individual constituency graphs that deliver the same main message
(albeit with more noise due to obvious sample size reasons).
Doing so we first observe that the split vote share has reasonably common
pre-treatment trends for working and other classes prior to the 1865 elections. This
indirectly implies that the common trend assumption may be realistic and so might
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allow some causal claims to be made concerning the main association of interest
reported in Table 1. The second key observation is that prior to 1865 split voting is
always more common among the working class than the middle class. The third key
observation is that for the 1865 election, split voting is about as common in both the
groups and in 1868 slightly less common among the working than the middle class.
Finally, and critically we note that the decrease in the split vote share among the working
class was in place already in 1865 and not only in 1868. This is important because the
1868 elections were affected by the franchise extension of 1867 (Berlinski, Dewan, and
Van Coppenolle 2014). Thus we observe that the decline in split ticket voting amongst
the working class precedes the main institutional change of the Victorian era.
In Appendix S1, we illustrate the same findings further by plotting over time the class
means of the residuals from a regression where split voting is predicted with only the
election year fixed effects (p. 7). The graphs focus on the relative differences between
the classes, while cleaning out the variation due to time in the occurrence of split voting.
The graphs show quite clearly the extent to which the behaviour of working class voters
converges with that of middle class ones with respect to split voting. Our results thus
corroborate Cox’s findings and go further in showing that the development of a party-
centred electorate in Victorian England owes much to the change in behaviour of the
English working classes.
[Table 1 and Figure 2 about here.]
3.2 Party Alignment
We have shown that a partisan electorate emerged in the United Kingdom in the period
prior to themajor institutional reforms and that themain driving forcewas a change in the
voting behaviour of working class voters. What effect did this have on the emerging party
system? The existence of the classic two-party class-based system based on alignment of
the British working class with the left Labour Party (and the corresponding alignment of
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the middle classes with the Conservatives) is shown through survey evidence from the
postwar period (Butler and Stokes 1969) –much of the subsequent literature documented
its decline. In the absence of survey data from earlier periods it is hard to show the
origins of class alignment, although there is some evidence that the two-party class-based
model was already in evidence in the interwar period and by the time Labour replaced the
Liberals as the main party of the left.7 A plausible, though not yet substantiated claim, is
that a two-party class-based system (albeit one of a different form) emerged much earlier
in Britain.8
In Table 2, we analyse how party voting behaviour changes over time.9 We ask
whether the working class voted Liberal more often than other classes prior to the 1865
election and whether they did so in 1865 and 1868 elections. The analysis is identical to
7Estimates showing this effect, and using corrected constituency level aggregate data,
were presented in earlier work by Carles Boix at the 2001 meetings of the Midwest
Political Science Association.
8As noted by Cox (1987, p. 162):
“At some point between the elector in 1851 who observed that, ‘as a tenant-farmer, I
well know that when we are given to understand which way our landlord means to
vote, and are canvassed by his steward and lawyer, we quite understand which way
we are expected to go,’ and the elector in 1951 who asserted, rather more succinctly,
‘I would vote for a pig if my party put one up,’ voting behaviour had clearly changed
considerably.”
9Our conclusions are robust to assigning the outcome variable value 0.5 if a voter casts
a split vote between the parties, although this tones down the magnitude of the estimates
slightly.
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the previous DID analysis on split voting bar the difference in outcome variable. Again,
the main coefficient of interest relates to the interaction variable between working class
status and the latter time period. This can be seen as a difference-in-differences estimate
of left voting amongst the working class in the post 1865 era.
Consistent with the results on split ticketing, we find that during the earlier period,
working class status is a predictor of casting split votes or voting Conservative rather than
Liberal in Guildford and in Sandwich. For Ashford there is also a positive correlation but
this finding is not statistically significant. In Ashford, in the 1865 and 1868 elections,
the Liberal party became much more popular among the middle class than in the earlier
period and this change is statistically significant. In Sandwich and Guilford there is not
much change in the popularity of the Liberals among the middle class. However, in the
latter period, and in all three constituencies, the popularity of the Liberals amongst the
working class increased. This effect of main interest is robust when including controls
within all the constituencies, and the effect is of similar magnitude across constituencies.
In order to interpret these coefficients, we again look at specification (6) in Table 2.
Prior to 1865 52.3% (Constant = 0.523) of the middle class voters voted Liberal in
Sandwich and 45.1% of the working class did so (Constant   0.072). After and during
1865, 54.1% of the non-working class voters voted Liberal (Constant + 0.018) whereas
56.1% of the working class did so (sum of all the reported coefficients). Thus, whereas
the middle class Liberal support stayed the same, there was a substantial change in the
behaviour of the working class. In sum, we observe an emerging alignment between the
working class and the Liberal Party that, as in the decline in split ticket voting, predates
the major institutional reforms of the late Victorian era.
We visualise the evolution of Liberal voting by class in Figure 3. Again, a similar
visualisation using regression residuals can be found in Appendix S1 (p. 8). When
comparing pre-treatment trends between classes with those concerning split voting
(Figure 2) it is less clear that (with respect to class voting) there are indeed common
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trends. This makes a causal interpretation of our findings with respect to the timing of
the class basis of partisan voting harder to defend. The second key observation is that
typically the Liberals were more popular among the middle class than the working class
in the earlier period, whereas in all constituencies the opposite was true in the latter
period. The increase in the Liberal vote share among the working class took place
already in 1865 and not only in 1868, that is, already before the 1867 reform.
In our supplementary materials (Appendix S1, p. 8), we repeat the estimations using
a sample of by-elections in Guildford (1858 and 1866) and Sandwich (1841, 1852, 1859
and 1866). In such elections, the constituents were electing only one candidate to replace
a politician whose term was terminated prematurely (for example, due to the politician
passing away). Therefore, the voters did not have the possibility to cast split votes and
the analysis allows us to verify that the observed change in Liberal voting is also present
nevertheless. The voting behaviour of the working class voters changed very similarly
after 1865 even in by-elections.
Analysis of our data thus reveals that the probability of Liberal voting was already
significantly higher amongst working class voters in 1865, prior to the introduction of
the Second Reform Act and the introduction of the Secret Ballot in 1872 that was
introduced in part as a way of reducing the political power of patrons over tenants.10
With respect to British politics this finding is significant in providing the first solid
evidence that support for the Liberal Party amongst the enfranchised skilled working
class predates the emergence of the more progressive or New Liberalism and was
established already during the Mid-Victorian era. That the genesis of the British
two-party class- based system was already in place at this time suggests that subsequent
developments are related to this fact. For example, it seems plausible that the emergence
of a Liberal Party under Gladstone with a radical programme of reform that appealed to
10Studies of the introduction of the Secret Ballot elsewhere shows strong evidence of its
impact on the voting behaviour of relatively poor voters (Baland and Robinson 2008).
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the newly enfranchised working class built on an existing alliance between workers and
Liberals and, in turn, reinforced this relationship.
In sum, we find evidence that two empirical trends – the party orientation of voters
and the class basis of party voting – predate the defining institutional changes of the
Victorian era. But while we do find evidence of a strengthening link between class and
voting behavior, the regression coefficients are small compared to levels. It appears that
class-based voting was still in its infancy in the 19th century. A common metric of class-
based voting is the so-called Alford index (Alford 1963). The measure is computed by
subtracting the percentage of middle class voters who vote for the liberal candidates from
the percentage of working class electors who vote for the liberal candidates. Our data
yields an Alford index roughly equal to -3.4 for the period before the year 1864, and 4.4
after that. We can contrast our numbers, for example, with those of Alford who studied
British opinion polls over the period 1952-1965. He found that the index averaged around
40. Thus, factors other than class were potentially more important for voting behavior in
Victorian England.11
[Table 2 and Figure 3 about here.]
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Causal claims based on our DID estimates rest on the assumption of common trends. In
Figure 4, we indirectly test this assumption by verifying that both outcomes have
common pre-treatment trends. We achieve this by estimating the following model
11Our evidence also suggests that farm workers (who were part of the working classes)
did not yet become significantly more likely to vote for the Liberals around and after 1865.
This may partially explain why the Alford index in our data is lower than that found in
later opinion poll data. For detailed results, see Table SI6 in Appendix SI2.
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resembling a typical dynamic difference-in-differences (or event study) specification:
yit = g+ d11[Working class]it+ Â
t 6=1859
{d2t1[Year = t] + d3t1[Year = t]⇥ 1[Working class]it}+ zit.
(2)
Figure 4 reports only the d3t coefficients for each t using pooled data from all
constituencies. We set the base year to 1859, i.e. the last year before our treatment period.
The last two coefficients (1865 and 1868) relate to the actual treatment period of interest.
That actual result of interest is robust to allowing a different coefficient for each year,
since three out of four coefficients are statistically significant. If, however, the coefficients
related to years prior to 1865 were shown to be statistically significant then the
hypothesis of common pre-treatment trends would be rejected. In one out of 14 cases
this is in fact the case. While this may be an indication of potential issues, it may also be
due to multiple testing.
Further sensitivity analyses is in Appendix S2. There we use alternative social class
divisions, reclassifying voters mimicking Eriksson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) five-class
scheme as closely as possible. This analysis reveals that the decline in split votes comes
mainly from non-skilled and skilled workers (p. 10). Second, we verify that the
alignment with the Liberals happens among non-skilled and skilled workers (p. 11).
Third, we show robustness to excluding voters voting for the first time after the Second
Reform Act of 1867 (p. 12). A concern is that the results could be driven by new voters
being more liberal. Our results suggest that this is not the case.12 Finally, (as we observe
12See also Berlinski andDewan (2011) who study the political consequences of franchise
extension. They show that there is no evidence relating Liberal support to changes in
the franchise rules, although the Second Reform Act did affect electoral competition and
candidate selection.
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some voters multiple times in the data) we include voter fixed effects (p. 13). This does
not change our key conclusions.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4 Ideological Appeal or Decline in Vote Buying?
What explains the development of emergence of a party-oriented electorate at this time?
Or, as Duverger asked “how did we pass from the system of 1850 to that of 1950”?
Having shown that a key factor (already in Mid-Victorian England) was an alignment of
the working classes with the Liberal Party, we next try to understand the mechanisms
that lie behind that alignment. According to Duverger the key factors that lead to the
emergence of party-oriented systems were the extension of popular suffrage, the role of
parliamentary prerogatives, and the emergence of organized mass parties on the left
who connected with working class voters on the basis of ideology.
We have shown that two empirical trends – the party orientation of voters and the
class basis of party voting – predate the major franchise reform of 1867. By extension it
can not be the case that organized mass parties played a role, for they did not exist at
that time. As shown by Hanham (1959), the process of developing national party
organisations able to support country-wide candidacies and campaigning activities did
not begin until after the Reform Act of 1867. Prior to this, political parties in the United
Kingdom were quintessential cadre parties, as defined by Duverger, namely coalitions of
legislators who voted together on issues and stood for election on a common
programme. The need for parties to develop coherent programmes was enhanced by the
decline in parliamentary prerogative and centralisation of executive power that occurred
a decade or so prior to the major institutional reforms. It is plausible then that, on the
basis of such programmes, and even in the absence of mass party organisation, an
ideological affinity emerged between the skilled working classes and the Liberal Party.
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However, there is another plausible explanation that relates to the fact that 19th
century elections were characterized by the presence of vote buying. Political parties and
candidates offered voters money or other types of benefits in exchange for their votes
and even gathered information on voters’ debts, crimes and infidelities to gain leverage
over them (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp, Dixit, and Stokes 2014). As shown in several
studies, the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 led to a substantial decrease in vote
buying (Cox 1987; Kam 2017). Camp, Dixit, and Stokes (2014) argue that the changes in
political and economic environment before the ballot reform were also important. As
larger groups were enfranchised and the median income of the electorate increased,
bribing voters became more expensive and less beneficial for the candidates. Closely
related to these arguments, Cox (1987) links the decline of vote buying in 19th century
England with the growth of electoral constituencies which also meant that a fixed
amount of money would buy a smaller proportion of votes. Moreover, Cox argues that
the power of individual MPs was declining during the 19th century. For instance, while
individual MPs were previously processing private bills which conferred, for example,
divorces, canals and railroads, these among some other responsibilities were moved to
courts and bureaus. As local lords could benefit less from having their own MP, also the
incentives to buy votes became smaller.
The argument that vote buying was a problem in Mid-Victorian England but became
less so towards the 1872 reform raises an important question: Was the decline in split
voting and working class alignment with the Liberals merely due to vote buying
becoming less common? We can shed some light on this question by focussing on the
behaviour of occupational groups that were likely to be particularly susceptible to vote
buying. In particular, we identify occupational groups that were prone to changing their
voting behaviour across elections before 1865, and define volatile and consistent groups
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of voters.13 In Appendix S3 we show that being a consistent working class voter is only
weakly associated with split voting after 1865 (p. 15). On the contrary, most of the
decrease in split voting comes from voters belonging to the volatile occupation groups
who change their voting behaviour. The estimates are much larger in absolute terms and
statistically highly significant. This is perhaps what one would expect to see, if we have
indeed classified those groups affected by vote buying properly and vote buying became
less common during our post-treatment period.
13First, we define a dummy for each voter and election on whether they changed
their voting behavior from the previous election. For example, consistent split voting is
defined as consistent voting behavior and moving from split voting to Liberals is volatile
behavior. Second, we calculate the mean over these dummies for each occupation. Third,
the occupation is defined as volatile if it is above 50th (or 75th in the other specification)
percentile in this mean variable. Previous literature on Victorian voting behaviour has
argued that some occupational groups were more prone to vote buying than others
and this is reflected in them switching their voting behavior more (Andrews 1998).
For instance, local lords could pressure small entrepreneurs such as shopkeepers by
threateningwith boycotts if they did not cast at least one vote for the lord’s candidate (Cox
1987). Hence, it is justifiable to define the vulnerability to vote buying at the occupational
instead of the individual level. Another rationale for this choice is that an individual voter
changing his voting decisions once or twice may be entirely normal but a large fraction
of voters in a whole occupational group changing its voting behaviour would lead one
to suspect vote buying. Moreover, more than one election would probably be needed to
define the likeliness of being affected by vote buying at the individual level. This would
mean unnecessary loss of some data.
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Furthermore, we observe that both the consistent working class and volatile working
class voters aligned with the Liberals (p. 16). The estimates are positive and statistically
significant and slightly larger for the volatile voters. We can conclude then that working
class alignment with the Liberals cannot be completely explained by a decline in vote
buying. This suggests that other factors were important also. While we do not directly
observe the effect, the patterns in our data are consistent with claims that working class
voters were attracted to the programmatic appeal of the Liberal Party. Stokes et al. have
argued that the diminishing role of agents reduced the advantages of vote buying and so
led parties to develop different (ideological) appeals that targeted groups of voters
rather than individual ones. Such programmatic appeals can be seen as a coordinated
partisan response to the institutional and socio-demographic changes that broke the
stranglehold of the brokers and aligned groups (or classes) of voters with parties on the
basis of ideology.
Recently, others have argued (alongside Stokes) that such programmatic appeals are
a critical element in political and economic development (see Acemoglu and Robinson
2012, Chapter 11). For example, Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) argue that
programmatic appeals can enhance welfare and use evidence from Benin that such
appeals are also optimal for candidates under some circumstances. We view our analysis
as complimentary to that of Stokes. Whereas she provides case study evidence that
parties were incentivised to develop ideological appeals, ours is (we believe) the first
quantitative analysis that is consistent with the claim that voters responded to such
appeals.
5 External Validity
The advantages of using rich data such as ours means that we can avoid some pitfalls
when making inferences frommore aggregated data. A limitation of our poll book data is
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that they are available for only three constituencies that may well differ from each other
and from unobserved constituencies. To assess the generalizability of our findings, we
contrast some patterns in our data to those in aggregate data.14 We combine electoral
data from Eggers and Spirling (2014) with the 1861 census obtained from the UK Data
Archive (Gatley et al. 2000).15
The first notion that arises from comparing the poll book data with census data is
that our constituencies have fewer working class residents than is typical. In Figure 5,
we report a histogram of working class shares while marking the location of our three
constituencies, based on poll book data (Sandwich) or the census (Ashford and
Guildford), by vertical red lines. We use the 1861 census information to measure the
working class share in these constituencies, and include only constituencies which have
14In Appendix S4 (p. 20), we also show that the composition of the electorate in our
poll book data is not drastically different to the composition in six other constituencies
for which we were able to obtain poll books with occupation information, but for a more
limited time period). Our on-going work documents that these constituencies are fairly
representative in terms of geography and demographics (results available upon request).
15The Eggers and Spirling (2014) data are available online at
http://andy.egge.rs/data.html (accessed August 24,2019). Besides limiting the
data to constituencies that we could link with the census info, we restrict the sample to
constituencies that are present for more than five elections between 1835 and 1868 (we
omit the entire year 1832, because the data are relatively scarce then). Moreover, we
only include constituencies that are present in both our before and after periods. These
restrictions are needed to ensure comparison of how voting behaviour evolves in the
same constituencies over time. This leaves us with 117 constituencies.
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elections in 1859. The census is available for Guildford, but not for Sandwich. For
Ashford, we use the census information from Kent, which Ashford is a part of.
Nevertheless, we also document tentative descriptive evidence that patterns from
our micro-data exist may be present more broadly. We report how the Liberal vote share
evolves in municipalities in two groups with above or below median share of working
class in Figure 6. This analysis attempts to graphically mimic our
difference-in-difference analysis at the aggregate level. Liberal voting does not increase
around 1865 in constituencies with less working class population, unlike it does in
working class dominant constituencies. In Appendix SI4 we show that the pattern is
likely driven by low skilled working class population (p. 19). This evidence should be
treated merely as tentative evidence given that none of the estimated effects turn out to
be statistically significant (not reported).
There are also other limitations: (i) the analysis takes places between rather than
within constituencies; (ii) we only observe working class share for one census year; and
(iii) the occupation information in the census follows a more aggregate classification
than the poll book information, and (iv) we do not have information on the share of
eligible voters, neither overall nor (and in particular) within each occupation. The last
point implies that we cannot separate whether a (possible) correlation between working
class share and the Liberal vote share is driven by voter alignment or by the eligibility to
vote. For example, comparing across constituencies using aggregate data one might find
that working class share is negatively correlated with Liberal vote share, even though, at
the individual level, working class voters are more likely to vote Liberal. This is due to
the possibility that, because of franchise restrictions, as the share of working class in a
constituency goes up then the share of middle class voters goes up. We discuss this issue
further in Appendix SI4 (p. 17-21).
[Figures 5 and 6 about here.]
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6 Conclusions
Why do political parties develop in they way they do? We have presented new evidence
based onmicro-level data from the Victorian period. In these, our concluding remarks, we
relate our findings to previous findings on party development. In particular we connect
to two main strands of literature: one takes an institutional approach in viewing parties
as solutions to collective dilemmas; the other has a sociological focus, seeing parties as
representative of specific societal groups.
A classic work within the first strand is that of Aldrich (1995) who wrote on the
development of American parties. He highlights the role that parties played in resolving
the problems of vote cycling in legislatures, those involved in the collective action of
mobilizing voters, while providing career paths for ambitious politicians. For example,
in chapter 5, he shows how Jacksonian Democracy was cemented by an alliance between
Van Buren and Jackson: The former organized the democratic caucus while the party
organisation provided electoral resources for state level politicians who adopted the
Jacksonian label. At the same time, the flip-side of the national Democratic bargain
involved the national party yielding local autonomy to state politicians on the key policy
issues. By contrast the British political system described by Cox (1987) was more
centralised. Cox argues that a party-oriented electorate emerged due to changes in the
structure and power of the executive and as a result of increasing demands on
Parliaments time. According to Cox (1984, 1986) these changes and their consequences
on party development preceded the major franchise reforms of the late nineteenth
century.
A different perspective sees party development as reflecting broader societal factors.
For example, La Palombara and Weiner (1966, p. 41-42) focus on “parties as a
consequence of the development process” and as the “culmination, as it were, of social,
economic and political change.” According to Von Beyme (1985), the connection
between social change and parties comes via ideology. He showed that parties in
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democratic regimes in the nineteenth and twentieth century can (almost always) be
classified as belonging to identifiable families spirituelle that share a common ideological
perspective. Building his classification on exhaustive documentation of party votes
shares, programmes and organisational details, he shows that parties originated as
representative of particular interests that prevailed at the time of their inception. Their
role was developing a clear set of ideas and principles, embodied in the party
programme, that reflected the concerns of such interests. Because different countries
follow similar development paths, party development thus follows a familiar pattern. In
the case of the Liberals (chapter 5) they developed a programme that represented the
interests of commerce and manufacturing, whereas their rival Conservatives were
connected to landed interests.
Our contributions to this literature are several. Our micro analysis of voting data
corroborates Cox’s claims that a party-oriented electorate emerged in the United
Kingdom prior to the major suffrage reforms (of 1867, 1872 and 1884) and so supports
the view that British parties emerged as a resolution to the collective dilemma faced by
legislators in Parliament. Going further, we connect to the second main strand of
literature, providing new evidence that the emergence of a party-oriented electorate was
in large part due to the increasing party orientation of working class voters. These voters
were increasingly likely to vote for the Liberal Party. Furthermore we show that the
mechanism behind this class alignment was programmatic appeal. In sum, the timing of,
and mechanism explaining, the emergence of a party-oriented electorate supports the
view of parties as solutions to collective dilemmas. Yet the evidence also shows that the
parties that emerged were connected to occupational groupings on the basis of their
programmes. Indeed, as we have argued, it is plausible that the early orientation of
working class voters to the Liberals stimulated the later development of class alignment
and that similar historical patterns exist elsewhere.
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Moving beyond these classic works on party development, much of what we know
about the alignment of voters with parties comes from a strand of literature that
generates insights from mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from
aggregate electoral data. Because techniques to evaluate them were established after
party-oriented systems emerged, surveys will do little to help us understand the genesis
of such systems and possible path dependency. Inferences drawn from aggregate data
are also subject to several caveats and this is particularly so when assessing voting data
when franchise restrictions are in place. Indeed, as we have shown, when assessing the
propensity of specific groups to vote for particular parties, we are unable to separate
whether correlations are driven by voter alignment or by the eligibility to vote within
that group. Our paper has instead shed new light on the emergence of party-oriented
systems using individual elector level panel data from the 19th century UK poll books.
More general lessons stem from our analysis and these are relevant both to
understanding party development in the developed and developing world. With respect
to the former, our analysis suggests that the genesis of Britain’s class-based two-party
system can be found almost a century before the survey based evidence of its existence
(and subsequent decline). Intriguingly, the emergence of the observed pattern of
partisan and class alignment occurred in the absence of parties with any semblance of
organisation within the electorate and seems to have been formed on the basis of
programmatic appeal. This speaks to recent findings by Wantchekon (2003) and
Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) who present evidence that programmatic politics can
be a viable alternative to clientelistic forms of engagement in the developing world
where party organisation is thin on the ground.
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Figure 1. Pages from Sandwich poll book, 1857.
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Table 1. Regression results on splitting the vote.
Panel A: Ashford
(1) (2)
1[Working class] 0.024 0.024
[0.085] [0.086]
1[Year 1865] -0.539**
[0.063]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.036 -0.035
[0.087] [0.087]
Constant 0.582**
[0.061]
N 502 502
R2 0.40 0.40
Panel B: Guildford
(3) (4) (5)
1[Working class] 0.084** 0.085** 0.084**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
1[Year 1865] -0.170**
[0.025]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.048 -0.049 -0.043
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Constant 0.286**
[0.015]
N 3402 3402 3402
R2 0.03 0.14 0.14
Panel C: Sandwich
(6) (7)
1[Working class] 0.041** 0.036**
[0.010] [0.010]
1[Year 1865] -0.048**
[0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.038* -0.034*
[0.016] [0.016]
Constant 0.106**
[0.008]
N 6541 6541
R2 0.01 0.04
Panel D: All constituencies
(8) (9) (10) (11)
1[Working class] 0.056** 0.054** 0.052** 0.053**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
1[Year 1865] -0.112**
[0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.044** -0.044** -0.051** -0.045**
[0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014]
Constant 0.179**
[0.008]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.15
Year FE
Parish/Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for
casting a split vote. Estimates are conditional on voting. Robust standard
errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote
statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 2. Split voting by class and election year.
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Table 2. Regression results on voting for the Liberals.
Panel A: Ashford
(1) (2)
1[Working class] 0.050 0.049
[0.079] [0.079]
1[Year 1865] 0.422**
[0.062]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.033 0.033
[0.090] [0.091]
Constant 0.253**
[0.055]
N 502 502
R2 0.17 0.17
Panel B: Guildford
(3) (4) (5)
1[Working class] -0.049 -0.037 -0.035
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
1[Year 1865] -0.001
[0.035]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.138** 0.126** 0.119**
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045]
Constant 0.395**
[0.022]
N 3402 3402 3402
R2 0.01 0.08 0.09
Panel C: Sandwich
(6) (7)
1[Working class] -0.072** -0.064**
[0.020] [0.020]
1[Year 1865] 0.018
[0.024]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.092** 0.084**
[0.032] [0.032]
Constant 0.523**
[0.016]
N 6541 6541
R2 0.01 0.04
Panel D: All constituencies
(8) (9) (10) (11)
1[Working class] -0.062** -0.058** -0.056** -0.053**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
1[Year 1865] 0.058**
[0.019]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.101** 0.099** 0.103** 0.097**
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Constant 0.472**
[0.013]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
Year FE
Parish/Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for
casting a Liberal vote. Estimates are conditional on voting. Robust
standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. * and **
denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 3. Liberal voting by class and election year.
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Figure 4. Coefficients from dynamic difference-in-differences estimation.
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SI1 Additional Figures and Tables
We show the location of the constituencies in our data (Ashford, Guildford, and
Sandwich) in Figure SI1. The map also shows the location of other constituencies for
which we have managed to find 19th-century poll books that contain occupational
information. Overall, poll books containing occupational information seem to exist
across England. This suggests that constituencies with such poll books are not
systematically different from others. However, the additional poll books do not include
elections from the time period of our interest, and we do not use them in this study.
Table SI1 illustrates the occupational composition of the working and middle classes
by showing ten most common professions within each class in our data. These ten
professions always account for at least half of the voters in the respective group and
hence provide fairly comprehensive picture of the classification and the occupations in
the data. While all possible classifications may have their issues and one may need to
compromise for example between income and social criteria, Table SI1 does not reveal
any striking misclassifications, at least from a purely subjective and intuitive
perspective.
Table SI2 summarizes voting behaviour by class and constituency. In Sandwich and
Guildford working class tends to give more split votes but party preferences are similar
across classes. In Ashford, the working class gives less split votes and votes more for
the Liberals than the middle class. However, this difference between constituencies will
turn out to be mainly a result of different election years rather than within election year
geographic differences.
We report election results for each election in our poll book sample in Table SI3.
Importantly, the number of candidates remains relatively constant throughout the time
period we study. There are typically three or four candidates running for two seats.
Therefore, it ought to be less likely that our findings would be driven merely by changes
in the candidate pool.
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Figures SI2 and SI3 plot DID graphics using residuals from regressions where we net
out year dummies. The graphs reflect the patterns we saw in corresponding illustrations
in the main text.
Finally, Table SI4 shows estimation results using a sample of by-elections in
Guildford (1858 and 1866) and Sandwich (1841, 1852, 1859 and 1866). In such elections,
the constituents were electing only one candidate to replace a politician whose term was
terminated prematurely (for example, due to the politician passing away). Therefore, the
voters did not have the possibility to cast split votes and the analysis allows us to verify
that the observed change in Liberal voting is also present nevertheless. Table SI4
demonstrates that the voting behaviour of the working class voters changed very
similarly after 1865 even in by-elections.
●
●
●
●
●
●
AshfordGuildford
Sheffield
Barnstaple
Beverley
Cambridge
Gloucester Maldon
Sandwich
Notes: Constituencies included in our data are marked with a cross. Constituencies
marked with a circle are other constituencies for which we have found poll books with
occupational information.
Figure SI1. Map of constituencies with poll books.
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Table SI1. Ten most common occupations by class and constituency.
Panel A: Ashford
Middle class (N = 237) Working class (N = 260)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Gentry 29 Farmer 25
2 Grocer 27 Carpenter 21
3 Draper 19 Shoe maker 17
3 Clerk 14 Labourer 16
5 Inn keeper 13 Butcher 14
6 Merchant 11 Baker 13
7 Doctor 10 Tailor 13
8 House proprietor 9 Engineer 11
9 Lawyer 9 Cabinet maker 10
10 Agent 7 Coach builder 10
Panel B: Guildford
Middle class (N = 1253) Working class (N = 2054)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Gentry 230 Carpenter 174
2 Dealer 149 Shoe maker 157
3 Grocer 133 Baker 123
3 Merchant 73 Tailor 119
5 Doctor 50 Labourer 105
6 Lawyer 48 Butcher 92
7 Inn keeper 46 Blacksmith 72
8 Victualler 43 Brick layer 71
9 Publican 40 Brewer 61
10 Clerk 39 Gardener 56
Panel C: Sandwich
Middle class (N = 2815) Working class (N = 3726)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Gentry 797 Pilot 356
2 Victualler 291 Mariner 283
3 Grocer 260 Baker 266
3 Army 162 Labourer 244
5 Dealer 114 Shoe maker 219
6 Publican 103 Carpenter 195
7 Merchant 97 Farmer 182
8 Doctor 81 Butcher 168
9 Inn keeper 81 Gardener 160
10 Education 74 Tailor 149
5
Table SI2. Aggregate level party votes by constituency and class.
Panel A: Ashford, parliamentary county elections (1852-1865)
Middle class (N = 242) Working class (N = 260) Difference
Liberal 0.642 0.537 -0.105
[0.632] [0.651] [0.057]
Conservative 0.181 0.244 0.063
[0.493] [0.504] [0.045]
Split 0.177 0.219 0.042
[0.422] [0.425] [0.038]
Panel B: Guildford, parliamentary borough elections (1832-1868)
Middle class (N = 1348) Working class (N = 2054) Difference
Liberal 0.369 0.395 0.026
[0.712] [0.692] [0.025]
Conservative 0.297 0.348 0.051**
[0.664] [0.646] [0.023]
Split 0.334 0.257 -0.077*
[0.511] [0.505] [0.018]
Panel C: Sandwich, parliamentary borough elections (1832-1868)
Middle class (N = 2815) Working class (N = 3726) Difference
Liberal 0.475 0.528 0.052*
[0.829] [0.791] [0.020]
Conservative 0.398 0.379 -0.019
[0.800] [0.765] [0.019]
Split 0.127 0.093 -0.034*
[0.367] [0.360] [0.009]
Notes: Only those voters who voted in general elections are included. Standard
deviations are reported in brackets. Differences in means are tested using
a t-test adjusted for clustering at the voter level. * and ** denote statistical
significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table SI3. Candidates in elections.
Kent, Eastern (Ashford) Guildford Sandwich
Election Electors Candidate Party Votes Election Electors Candidate Party Votes Election Electors Candidate Party Votes
1852 7119 Sir E. C. Dering, Bt. L 3063 1832 342 J. Mangles L 299 1832 916 J. Marryat L 495
W. Deedes C 2879 C. B. Wall C 180 Sir. E. T. Troubridge, B.t. L 485
Sir B. W. Bridges, Bt. C 2356 Hon. C. F. Norton L 138 S. G. Price C 361
1857 8000 Sir B. W. Bridges, Bt. C 2379 1835 537 J. Mangles L 299 Sir. E. W. C. R. Owen C 265
Sir E. C. Dering, Bt. L 2358 C. B. Wall C 214 1835 934 S. G. Price C 551
W. Deedes C 2216 H. A. C. Austen L 131 Sir E. T. Troubridge, Bt. L 405
E. A. Acheson L 127 1837 425 C. B. Wall C 252 Sir E. W. C. R. Owen C 389
1865 8250 Sir B. W. Bridges, Bt. C 3208 Hon. J. Y. Scarlett C 188 1837 911 Sir E. T. Troubridge, Bt. L 416
Sir E. C. Dering, Bt. L 3195 J. Mangles L 159 Sir J. R. Carnac, Bt. L 401
Sir N. J. Knatchbull, Bt. C 2919 1841 486 R. D. Mangles L 242 S. G. Price C 370
1868 13107 E. L. Pemberton C 5231 C. B. Wall L 221 Sir B. W. Bridges, Bt. C 330
Hon. G. W. Milles C 5104 Hon. J. Y. Scarlett C 177 1847 943 Lord Clarence Paget L 459
H. J. Tufton L 4685 H. Currie C 161 C. W. Grenfell L 437
Sir J. Croft, Bt. L 4579 1847 585 H. Currie C 336 Lord Charles Clinton C 392
R. D. Mangles L 242 1857 1008 E. H. K Hugessen L 547
T. L. Thurlow C 184 Lord Clarence Paget L 503
1852 648 R. D. Mangles L 370 J. McGregor C 322
J. Bell L 251 J. Lang L 24
T. L. Thurlow C 184 1859 1030 E. H. K Hugessen L 497
1857 666 R. D. Mangles L 349 Lord Clarence Paget L 458
W. Bovill C 338 Sir J. Fergusson, Bt. C 404
J. Bell L 167 W. D. Lewis C 328
1865 667 G. J. H. M. E. Onslow L 333 1865 1054 E. H. K Hugessen L 494
W. Bovill C 318 Lord Clarence Paget L 477
W. W. Pocock L 228 C. Capper C 413
1868 1906 E. H. K Hugessen L 933
H. A. Brassey L 923
H. Worms C 710
Notes: C = Conservative, L = Liberal, Hon. = honourable, Bt. = baronet. Source: Craig (1977).
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
S
pl
it 
vo
te
1850 1855 1860 1865 1870
Year
Panel A: Ashford
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
S
pl
it 
vo
te
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel B: Guildford
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
S
pl
it 
vo
te
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel C: Sandwich
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
S
pl
it 
vo
te
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel D: All constituencies
Middle class Working class
Figure SI2. Graphical representation of the DID analysis on split voting residuals.
7
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Li
be
ra
l v
ot
e
1850 1855 1860 1865 1870
Year
Panel A: Ashford
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Li
be
ra
l v
ot
e
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel B: Guildford
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Li
be
ra
l v
ot
e
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel C: Sandwich
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Li
be
ra
l v
ot
e
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Year
Panel D: All constituencies
Middle class Working class
Figure SI3. Graphical representation of the DID analysis on voting for Liberals
residuals.
Table SI4. Regression results using data from by-elections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Working class] -0.063** -0.050* -0.050* -0.050*
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
1[Year 1865] -0.105**
[0.022]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.149** 0.134** 0.135** 0.135**
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Constant 0.548**
[0.018]
N 5167 5167 5167 5167
R2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04
Notes: Only by-elections in Guildford (1858 and 1866) and Sandwich
(1841, 1852, 1859 and 1866) are included. Outcome is a dummy for
casting a liberal vote. Estimates are conditional on voting. Robust
standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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SI2 Additional Sensitivity Checks
We provide additional robustness analysis in this Appendix. We begin by exploring
sensitivity of our main results to alternative social class divisions by reclassifying the
voters mimicking Eriksson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) five-class scheme as closely as
possible (see also Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). As a minor deviation, we include a
sixth class, the landed gentry. First, we show in Table SI5 that the decline in split votes
comes mainly from non-skilled and skilled workers. Second, we verify in Table SI6 that
the alignment with the Liberals happens among the non-skilled and skilled workers.
Tables SI7 and SI8 demonstrate how our middle and working classes and different
occupations map into the Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
In Table SI9, we study whether the results are robust to excluding those voters from
the sample who voted for the first time in 1868 elections in Ashford or Sandwich. While
the fact that original poll book data for Sandwich excluded voters enfranchised in 1867
implies that results concerning Sandwich should not be attributed to the reform, there are
some voters who were eligible to vote before but did not exercise their right to do so. The
results remain the same after excluding these voters from the estimation sample.
We observe some of the voters multiple times and some of them move between social
classes. Thus, it is possible to include voter fixed effects in our estimations.1 We study
the robustness of our results to including these fixed effects in Table SI10. The results
concerning split voting are very similar even after the voter fixed effects are included.
However, the coefficient of the interaction term is slightly toned down in the case of
Liberal voting once the fixed effects are introduced.
1We include only voters who are observed at least twice in this analysis. This changes our estimation
sample slightly.
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Table SI5. Split voting using Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Non-skilled worker] 0.076** 0.068** 0.057** 0.059**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
1[Skilled worker] 0.100** 0.095** 0.068** 0.065**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014]
1[Farm worker] 0.087** 0.086** 0.087** 0.081**
[0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.025]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] 0.036* 0.033* 0.011 0.006
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
1[White-collar worker] 0.077** 0.067** 0.037* 0.033
[0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018]
1[Year 1865] -0.086**
[0.018]
1[Non-skilled worker] ×1[Year 1865] -0.057* -0.048 -0.075** -0.040
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027]
1[Skilled worker] ×1[Year 1865] -0.080** -0.076** -0.094** -0.050*
[0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
1[Farm worker] ×1[Year 1865] -0.035 -0.032 -0.048 -0.025
[0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.037]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] ×1[Year 1865] -0.023 -0.020 -0.034 0.006
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
1[White-collar worker] ×1[Year 1865] -0.055* -0.044 -0.063* -0.009
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.026]
Constant 0.141**
[0.013]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.16
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting
a split vote. Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all three
constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors clustered by voter
are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table SI6. Liberal voting using Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Non-skilled worker] -0.070* -0.066* -0.056 -0.047
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030]
1[Skilled worker] -0.037 -0.040 -0.019 -0.013
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
1[Farm worker] -0.051 -0.056 -0.058 -0.047
[0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.040]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] 0.050 0.042 0.059* 0.063*
[0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029]
1[White-collar worker] -0.017 -0.025 -0.002 0.006
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
1[Year 1865] 0.045
[0.037]
1[Non-skilled worker] ×1[Year 1865] 0.111* 0.105* 0.106* 0.071
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052]
1[Skilled worker] ×1[Year 1865] 0.121** 0.126** 0.123** 0.088*
[0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]
1[Farm worker] ×1[Year 1865] 0.071 0.073 0.076 0.048
[0.064] [0.064] [0.063] [0.062]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] ×1[Year 1865] 0.004 0.010 0.005 -0.028
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046]
1[White-collar worker] ×1[Year 1865] 0.034 0.039 0.027 -0.021
[0.052] [0.052] [0.051] [0.052]
Constant 0.455**
[0.023]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for
casting a Liberal vote. Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all
three constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors clustered
by voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table SI7. Common occupations in different classes.
Eriksson-Goldthorpe class Middle class Working class
White-collar workers Doctor, army, education, clerk,
lawyer, religion
Petty bourgeoisie Grocer, victualler, dealer,
merchant, publican
Farm workers Farmer, gardener,
yeoman, ostler, grazier
Skilled workers Baker, shoe maker,
carpenter, pilot, tailor
Non-skilled workers Labourer, mariner, brick
layer, currier, carrier
Table SI8. Mapping between Eriksson-Goldthorpe and two-class classification.
Middle class Working class
Farm workers 0 546
Non-skilled workers 0 1291
Skilled workers 0 4203
Petty bourgeoisie 1969 0
White-collar workers 1250 0
Landed gentry 1186 0
Table SI9. Regression results excluding the first-time voters in 1868.
Split vote Liberal vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1[Working class] 0.056** 0.054** 0.052** 0.053** -0.062** -0.058** -0.056** -0.053**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
1[Year 1865] -0.112** 0.055**
[0.011] [0.020]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.039** -0.039** -0.044** -0.041** 0.087** 0.086** 0.090** 0.087**
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Constant 0.179** 0.472**
[0.008] [0.013]
N 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Voters who vote for the first time after the Reform Act of 1867 are
omitted. Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together. Robust
standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table SI10. Regression results including voter fixed effects.
Split vote Liberal vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[Working class] 0.069** 0.034 0.034 -0.087** -0.057* -0.057*
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
1[Year 1865] -0.076** -0.003
[0.016] [0.017]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.044* -0.038 -0.038 0.042 0.037 0.037
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
N 8923 8923 8923 8923 8923 8923
R2 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.68 0.71 0.71
Year FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. Only voters who are observed at least
twice are included in the estimation sample. All regressions include voter fixed effects.
Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled
together. Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. * and
** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
SI3 Vote Buying Analysis
This Appendix discusses the details of our vote buying analysis. To identify occupational
groups that weremore susceptible to vote buying, we define a procedure that builds upon
arguments made in previous research that radical inconsistencies or volatility in voting
behaviour across different elections can be treated as an indication of vote buying (see
Andrews 1998).2
First, we define a dummy for changing voting behaviour from the previous election
for each voter. This dummy gets value one if a voter switches from Conservative (Liberal)
to Liberal (Conservative) or split vote or from split vote to Conservative or Liberal vote.
Then, we compute the average of this measure for all occupations using data from the
period before 1865, i.e. our pre-treatment period. The measure serves as a proxy for the
2Andrews (1998) writes that radical changes in voting behaviour is not itself an indication of vote
buying. However, he also notes that certain occupational groups were more likely to switch their electoral
behaviour across elections and speculates that these voters were a group of people who “might be very
glad of the additional income that a well-placed bribe, however neatly colored, might provide”.
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propensity to be affected by vote buying. Finally, we define a dummy for belonging to a
group likely affected by vote buying by splitting the sample by different thresholds (50th
and 75th percentile) in the average volatility measure.
The group of volatile voters includes bothworking andmiddle class. A slightmajority,
roughly three out of five, of these volatile voters belong to the former. Voters classified
as volatile often work as, for instance, small entrepreneurs such as shoe makers, dealers,
innkeepers and tailors and labourers. Indeed, these occupations overlap partially with
those groups that Andrews (1998) suspects were more likely affected by vote buying in
Sandwich.
We employ the pooled data set consisting of all three constituencies and estimate
equations of form
yit =l+ q11[Working class]it + q21[Volatile voter]it + q31[Year   1865]t+
q41[Working class]it ⇥ 1[Year   1865]t + q51[Year   1865]t ⇥ 1[Volatile voter]it + hit.
(1)
Contrary to our previous estimations, we redefine the working class dummy so that the
class includes only consistent voters (who are less likely to be affected by vote buying).
We can then interpret the coefficients for the group dummies and their year interactions as
effects relative to those amongst middle class voters who were consistent in their voting
behaviour.
The estimation results are shown in Tables SI11 (split voting) and SI12 (Liberal votes).
The first conclusions that we can draw from these tables are in line with the results
discussed in the main text. First, we find that being a consistent working class voter is a
strong and robust predictor of split and Liberal voting prior to the 1865 elections (the
coefficient related to the Working class variable), the coefficients being statistically
significant and positive and negative, respectively. Second, split voting goes down for all
voters (the coefficient related to 1[Year   1865]t) in elections during and subsequent to
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1865. Third, both consistent and volatile working class voters become more likely to cast
Liberal votes in and after the year 1865.
Here, however, our question of interest is what happens to working class and volatile
voters’ behaviour in 1865 and after, i.e. the coefficients related to the interaction terms.
First, it appears that being a consistent working class voter is only weakly associated with
split voting after 1865. The estimated coefficients are rather small, around 2  3%. On the
contrary, most of the decrease in split voting comes from volatile voters who change their
voting behaviour. The estimates are much larger in absolute terms and statistically highly
significant. This is perhaps what one would expect to see, if we have indeed classified
those groups affected by vote buying properly and vote buying became less common
during our post-treatment period. In Tables SI13 and SI14, we re-estimate equation (1)
but split the group of volatile voters into volatile working class voters and volatile middle
class voters, and contrast their and consistent working class voters’ outcomes to those of
consistently voting members of the middle class. These tables show that the effects for
the volatile voters mainly come from the volatile working class voters changing their
behaviour.
Table SI11. Role of vote buying, split votes I.
50th percentile 75th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1[Working class] 0.035* 0.033* 0.037** 0.041** 0.048** 0.045** 0.046** 0.049**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
1[Year 1865] -0.098** -0.106**
[0.014] [0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.014 -0.011 -0.009 -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.023
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016]
1[Volatile voter] 0.098** 0.090** 0.078** 0.080** 0.107** 0.100** 0.080** 0.080**
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
1[Volatile voter] ×1[Year 1865] -0.071** -0.065** -0.068** -0.058** -0.094** -0.086** -0.084** -0.068**
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018]
Constant 0.154** 0.166**
[0.010] [0.008]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.16
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. The outcome is dummy for casting a split vote. Estimates are
conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors clustered
by voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table SI12. Role of vote buying, Liberal votes I.
50th percentile 75th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1[Working class] -0.053* -0.050* -0.052* -0.051* -0.076** -0.071** -0.071** -0.069**
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
1[Year 1865] 0.068** 0.050*
[0.025] [0.021]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.067 0.064 0.065 0.070* 0.087** 0.084** 0.086** 0.087**
[0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
1[Volatile voter] -0.043* -0.040* -0.029 -0.026 -0.039* -0.039* -0.024 -0.019
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
1[Volatile voter] ×1[Year 1865] 0.059 0.059 0.056 0.047 0.110** 0.108** 0.099** 0.083**
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
Constant 0.471** 0.476**
[0.017] [0.014]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. The outcome is dummy for casting a Liberal vote. Estimates
are conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors
clustered by voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Table SI13. Role of vote buying, split votes II.
50th percentile 75th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1[Working class] 0.035* 0.033* 0.037** 0.041** 0.048** 0.073** 0.046** 0.049**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
1[Year 1865] -0.098** -0.106**
[0.014] [0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 -0.020 -0.020 -0.126** -0.018 -0.023
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.012] [0.017] [0.016]
1[Volatile working class] 0.059** 0.052** 0.043** 0.046** 0.087** 0.113** 0.050* 0.056**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
1[Volatile middle class] 0.118** 0.111** 0.097** 0.099** 0.114** 0.139** 0.089** 0.088**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
1[Volatile middle class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.032 -0.025 -0.018 -0.020 -0.055* -0.162** -0.017 -0.019
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.028] [0.026] [0.028] [0.027]
1[Volatile working class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.092** -0.088** -0.097** -0.080** -0.111** -0.217** -0.113** -0.089**
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.021] [0.017] [0.021] [0.020]
Constant 0.154** 0.166** 0.141**
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.16
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. The outcome is dummy for casting a split vote. Estimates are conditional on
voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported
in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table SI14. Role of vote buying, Liberal votes II.
50th percentile 75th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1[Working class] -0.053* -0.050* -0.052* -0.051* -0.076** -0.071** -0.071** -0.069**
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
1[Year 1865] 0.068** 0.050*
[0.025] [0.021]
1[Working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.067 0.064 0.065 0.070* 0.087** 0.084** 0.086** 0.087**
[0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
1[Volatile working class] 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.010 -0.023 -0.030 -0.012 -0.011
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
1[Volatile middle class] -0.068** -0.063** -0.050* -0.046* -0.044* -0.043* -0.028 -0.022
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
1[Volatile middle class] ×1[Year 1865] -0.024 -0.023 -0.030 -0.030 0.041 0.040 0.021 0.016
[0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046]
1[Volatile working class] ×1[Year 1865] 0.109** 0.108** 0.109** 0.094** 0.143** 0.142** 0.138** 0.117**
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035]
Constant 0.471** 0.476**
[0.017] [0.014]
N 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445 10445
R2 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08
Year FE
Constituency FE
Year-Constituency FE
Notes: Only general elections are included. The outcome is dummy for casting a Liberal vote. Estimates are
conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together. Robust standard errors clustered by
voter are reported in brackets. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
SI4 External Validity
This appendix reports additional analyses on external validity of our results. First, we
explore the aggregate patterns further by grouping the working class into low skilled
occupations (labourers and workers in agriculture, mining, and domestic service), and
high skilled occupations (building, manufacturing, and transportation workers). The
latter group will contain a larger share of eligible voters. Figure SI4 attempts to
graphically mimic our difference-in-difference analysis at the aggregate level. We report
how the Liberal vote share evolves in municipalities in two groups with above or below
median share of low (or high) skilled working class. Liberal voting does not increase
around 1865 in constituencies with a large share of high skilled working class (Panel A),
unlike it does in constituencies with more low skilled working class (Panel B). Given
this, the main results of this paper concerning the alignment of the working class with
the left seems more likely to generalize to the behaviour of low skilled working class.
Comparing across constituencies using aggregate data one might find that working
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class share is negatively correlated with Liberal vote share, even though, at the individual
level, working class voters are more likely to vote Liberal. This is due to the possibility
that, because of franchise restrictions, as the share of working class in a constituency goes
up then the share of middle class voters goes up. We construct a proxy of voter eligibility
share as the total votes in constituency divided by the number of adult males who gain
wages in year 1861. Since women and men who received no wages were disenfranchised
the numerator is never larger than the denominator. Figure SI5 illustrates a negative
correlation between working class population and enfranchised population. In Figure
SI6, we show that the share of low-skilled working class is indeed negatively correlated
with eligibility, whereas the share of high-skilled is positively correlated. For the sake
of clarity, the figures show binned averages within twenty bins with equal number of
observations and linear fits.
Finally, to further explore how the voters in our data compare with constituents in
other constituencies, we report the distribution of different social classes in our data and
six other constituencies for which we were able to acquire poll books with occupational
information (see Table SI15). These are Sheffield (two elections in 1852 and 1857; White
and Arthur 2001), Barnstaple (three elections in 1847-1857), Beverley (elections in 1857
and 1859), Cambridge (three elections in 1847-1857), Gloucester (two elections in 1857
and 1859), and Maldon (two elections in 1847 and 1852). The social class composition
of the voters in our poll book data does not drastically differ from that in the six other
constituencies for which we were able to obtain some poll book information.
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Figure SI4. Evolution of Liberal voting by the share of working class population.
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Figure SI5. Working class share and eligibility to vote.
Table SI15. Distribution of social classes in poll books of nine constituencies.
Working classes Middle classes
Non-skilled Skilled Farm Petty White-collar Landed
Constituency workers workers workers bourgeoisie workers gentry
Ashford 0.09 0.36 0.07 0.24 0.19 0.05
Barnstaple 0.10 0.39 0.06 0.21 0.13 0.11
Beverley 0.17 0.45 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.08
Cambridge 0.11 0.43 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.06
Gloucester 0.13 0.43 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.06
Guildford 0.11 0.46 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.07
Maldon 0.38 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.05
Sandwich 0.13 0.38 0.06 0.18 0.10 0.14
Sheffield 0.0032 0.47 0.05 0.27 0.13 0.08
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Figure SI6. High- and low-skilled working class and eligibility to vote.
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